Soviet troops (height): 115,000
Afghan troops (height): 55,000
Mujahideen troops (height): 200,000–250,000
Soviet forces casualties: 14,453 Afghan forces casualties: 18,000
Mujahideen forces casualties: 75,000–90,000
Afghan civilians casualties:850,000–1,500,000
Afghanistan refugees that fled the country: 5 million
By the late '70s, it was becoming increasingly clear who emerged victorious from the Cold War conflict. The United States had the upper hand on the economic, political, and social fronts compared to the Soviet Union, which was starting to lag in many respects. Unfortunately, Afghanistan, by this time and still today, is a third-world country in constant war against poverty and religious extremism. Geographically, it was at the crossroads of major trading routes connecting the East with the West. Throughout its history, many large and powerful empires fought for control over this vital region until, eventually, Afghanistan won independence in 1919.
Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Premier, was determined not to escalate Afghanistan's volatile situation further. The Soviet Union had continuously backed left-oriented governments throughout the region, supporting the leftist government in Iran and following the same process with its neighboring Afghanistan. However, with the rise of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the risk that other neighboring states could adopt the Islamic model became a real possibility. If Iranian shockwaves could penetrate the Muslim areas under Soviet control, this could signal the utter collapse of Soviet rule in the "Stan" Soviet Republics.
An air and land invasion of Afghanistan commenced on Christmas Eve, 1979, with the Red Army seizing many urban centers, roads, and communication lines. Hafizullah Amin, the unstable ruler of Afghanistan, was captured and executed, replaced by the more progressive and moderate Babrak Karmal. The Soviet intervention quickly created a global chain reaction of international disputes on whether this was an intervention or an invasion. The West and most Muslim countries condemned the Soviet move as aggression and invasion.
The tribal leaders were repulsed to the mountains by the invasion, but this would become a new stage in their struggle. Committed and deciding to launch a forensic guerrilla campaign under Ahmad Shah Massoud's leadership on the Soviets, the Orthodox/Atheist invader credited this as a Jihad (A Holy War), making it easy for the tribes to unite into one faction, The Mujahedeen (Those who fight for the cause of God). The U.S. saw the opportunity and began funding equipment for the Mujahedeen through Pakistan. Both the U.S. and the Mujahedeen had a common enemy—the U.S. aimed to curb Communism and Soviet influence, while the Mujahedeen wanted the Soviet invaders out of Afghanistan.
The call for Jihad saw many foreign nationals join the Afghan war, including the notable figure, the rich and striking Saudi Osama bin Laden. Despite all the international support, the Soviets held the upper hand. The Red Army quickly found itself in a deadlock resembling the American conflict in Vietnam. The Search and Destroy missions failed to suppress Mujahedeen's resistance, and no matter how many battles they won, it seemed as if the Soviets were losing the war. It was not until 1985 that this routine finally wore on Soviet politics and patience—the illusion of tremendous Communist power began to disintegrate before them. Mikhail Gorbachev, who took control the same year, began following a unique foreign policy approach markedly different from his predecessors.
The state-of-the-art missiles supplied to the Mujahedeen degraded the war effort in 1986. In turn, they started mounting a much more effective resistance, accurately destroying Soviet helicopters and impeding the Red Army's ability to scale the high mountains. The Soviets realized the fallacy of continuing this war and began planning an exit strategy for Soviet troops. They replaced the puppet Kemal with Mohammed Najibullah to transfer the burden of fighting to the Afghan Army. In 1988, Gorbachev officially signed the Geneva Accords, which would see the USSR withdrawing from Afghanistan in exchange for no further intervention from any power. In 1989, the Red Army's last remnants left Afghanistan, officially ending the Soviet-Afghan War.
Unfortunately, the Soviets had planted a seed of mischief and destruction that continues today. The decades of uninterrupted war that continues to ravish the poor-torn Afghanistan country open new wounds for the millions of Afghanis who helplessly watch in horror as their future is demolished before their own eyes. It is up to the international community to restore order and stability in Afghanistan to ensure peace in the region and restore the pride and lost dignity of the Afghan people.
Bibliography:
1. ATANASOSKI, N. (2013). RESTORING NATIONAL FAITH: The Soviet-Afghan War in U.S. Media and Politics. In Humanitarian Violence: The U.S. Deployment of Diversity (pp. 102-127). Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press.
2. A Nearby Observer. (1982). The Afghan-Soviet War: Stalemate or Evolution? Middle East Journal, 36(2), 151-164.
3. Akhtar, N. (2008). PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE TALIBAN. International Journal on World Peace, 25(4), 49-73
4. Overholt, W. (1980). The Geopolitics of the Afghan War. Asian Affairs, 7(4), 205-217.
5. Joes, A. (2010). Afghanistan: End of the Red Empire. In Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions That Shaped Our World (pp. 167-229).
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